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Finnish Versions of Pragmatist
Humanism
Eino Kaila and Georg Henrik von Wright as Quasi-Pragmatists
Sami Pihlström
AUTHOR'S NOTE
This is not exactly the paper I presented at the conference on “European Pragmatism” in
Vienna in April, 2018, on which this publication is based. At that conference, I discussed
Nordic pragmatism (cf. Pihlström 2010). This essay summarizes some of my views on
Kaila’s and von Wright’s relations to pragmatism originally developed in other contexts
(see the bibliography for references). In addition to three anonymous reviewers, I am
greatly indebted to Martin Kusch, Matthias Neuber, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Mikko Salmela,
Friedrich Stadler, and of course the late Georg Henrik von Wright regarding many of the
ideas discussed in this essay.
 
1. Introduction
1 As the papers in this collection demonstrate, philosophers active in Europe in the early
decades of the twentieth century developed not only insightful and original responses to
the American pragmatist tradition but also philosophical ideas not explicitly influenced
by the American pragmatists yet bearing striking resemblance to pragmatist thought.
Philosophers  in  the  Nordic  countries  were  no  exception.  Pragmatist  themes  were
discussed  early  on  especially  in  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Finland.  (For  historical
examinations of “Nordic pragmatism,” see Pihlström 2010; Rydenfelt 2018.) This paper
will not trace the general history of Nordic pragmatism reception. I will only examine, as
a case study, two major Finnish philosophers, Eino Kaila (1890-1958) and Georg Henrik
von Wright (1916-2003), whose contributions to pragmatism were perhaps not obvious –
and are certainly less known and less frequently acknowledged than their contributions
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to  logical  empiricism  and  analytic  philosophy  –  but  were  nevertheless  original  and
potentially relevant to the on-going re-evaluation of  the pragmatist  tradition and its
European influences and analogies.
2 Obviously, pragmatism has never been a major current of thought in Finland or any of the
other Nordic countries; even so, William James’s writings, in particular, were relatively
widely  read  in  the  1910s,  and  some  critical  discussions  continued  in  the  1920-30s,
although after those decades pragmatism was – as in many other places, too – eclipsed by
logical empiricism.1 Some Finnish thinkers were genuinely interested in pragmatism even
in the 1940s and 1950s, when analytic philosophy became overwhelmingly dominant. The
grand old man of Finnish analytic philosophy, von Wright, referred to Peirce and James in
his introductory book on logical empiricism (von Wright 1943). Oiva Ketonen, who (like
von  Wright)  was  Kaila’s  pupil  and  who  became  Kaila’s  successor  as  Professor  of
Theoretical  Philosophy at  the  University  of  Helsinki,  wrote  an essay on Dewey after
Dewey’s death (Ketonen 1954), and his Deweyan naturalism is also visible, for instance, in
his  popular  work  on  ”the  world-view  of  the  European  man,”  Eurooppalaisen  ihmisen
maailmankatsomus (Ketonen 1981 [1961]: chapter 10). However, most Finnish philosophers
around that time, and perhaps even more so in the 1970s and 1980s, were presumably
relatively  unfamiliar  with  pragmatism.  None  of  the  internationally  well-established
analytic philosophers in Finland – von Wright, Ketonen, Erik Stenius, Jaakko Hintikka,
Raimo Tuomela, Ilkka Niiniluoto – can be said to have been a pragmatist, but upon closer
inspection it is clear that most if not all of them have been preoccupied with pragmatist
or at least quasi-pragmatist themes.2
3 The most important figure in the early Finnish reception and development of pragmatism
was undoubtedly Eino Kaila. As a young man, Kaila was impressed by James’s philosophy
and other pragmatist  ideas (cf.,  e.g.,  Jääskeläinen 1983:  13,  16-8;  Niiniluoto 1990:  18).
Already in 1911, he wrote an essay on Henri Bergson (Kaila 1911a), whose vitalism and
anti-intellectualism had influenced James’s late views, and in the same year he published
another short paper with references to philosophers close to pragmatism – Bergson, Emil
Boutroux, and F. C. S. Schiller (Kaila 1911b). In 1912 he interpreted James’s views to the
readers of the newspaper Uusi Suometar in a paper to be discussed in some detail shortly.
He then reviewed several Finnish translations of James’s works (Kaila 1914, 1915, 1916).
While Kaila soon turned to other ways of philosophizing and became a kind of external
member of the Vienna Circle in the late 1920s and early 1930s, his logical empiricism still
contained significant traces of pragmatism, as can be seen by studying his later works
(Kaila 1986 [1943], 2014 [1939]).3
4 Among Kaila’s many students who later became distinguished professors,  von Wright
stands out as the most eminent figure. The pragmatist dimensions of his thought were
much less explicit than Kaila’s, though. It would be impossible even to begin to describe
von Wright’s enormous impact on the development of logic, philosophy of science, theory
of action, and many other fields; I will only, after having explored Kaila’s pragmatism at
some length,  provide some remarks on a  pragmatist  aspect  we may perceive in von
Wright’s views on causation and action (see further Pihlström 2014).
5 I will begin by an exposition of some of Kaila’s views relevant to the topic of this paper –
first his early pragmatist writings and then his later discussions of “practical testability”
– and subsequently move on to consider von Wright’s pragmatist lines of thought. Overall
the paper will  suggest that these two philosophers and the many others around and
succeeding them (not to be discussed here) might be seen as having established a hidden
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tradition of Finnish philosophy: a kind of pragmatist humanism.  Their versions of such
pragmatism  are  quite  different,  however.  Whereas  Kaila  moved  from  a  Jamesian
pragmatist  humanism concerned with  religion and metaphysical  Weltanschauungen to
logical empiricism and its critique of metaphysics, von Wright’s humanist or pragmatist
ideas are to be found,  for example,  in his theory of  action and “actionist” theory of
causation. As a public philosopher engaged with societal and cultural issues, von Wright
was,  moreover,  closer  to  Deweyan social  humanism than Kaila  (without  any  explicit
Deweyan influences, though).
 
2. Kaila’s Early Pragmatist Influences
6 The  1912  article  on  James  is,  clearly,  the  most  important  among  Kaila’s  early
contributions  to  pragmatism.  In  this  relatively  popular  essay  Kaila  emphasizes  the
significance of James’s pragmatism as a new, revolutionary philosophy. James, he claims,
has shown us that we are not mere passive spectators of the world but, above all, actors
(Kaila 1912: 84). According to Kaila, James’s view is a “new answer” to the problem of how
someone  who  does  not  want  to  give  up  reason  and  rationality,  or  make  any  easy
intellectual compromises,  can still  deal with their religious needs,  with their hope to
reach “higher” spirituality in life, a hope whose satisfaction might be necessary for the
happiness of their entire life (ibid.: 81-2). Kaila here endorses James’s doctrine of the “Will
to  Believe”  (see  James  1979  [1897]:  chapter  1):  a  religious  or  “idealistic”  hypothesis
concerning the significance of human life in connection with a more spiritual eternal
universe can be accepted through an active, voluntary effort; yet, we have to embrace
such beliefs with our own risk, being unable to ever finally “prove” any such hypotheses.
Still, according to both James and Kaila, it is better to believe and act on the basis of such
an insecure belief than to fall into skeptical or agnostic inactivity. Only thus can life have
a deeper meaning and be worth living. (Kaila 1912: 84-6.) The same idea is repeated, for
instance,  in  Kaila’s  (1917)  short  biography  of  Ernest  Renan.  These  early  writings
demonstrate that Kaila was intensely preoccupied with religious and existential issues,
even though his professional academic work focused, at that time, mostly on empirical
psychology.
7 Let me quote Kaila (paraphrasing James) at some length:
All  life,  therefore,  consists  essentially  in  daring,  “risking”  –  life-threatening
experiments, in which we expose a great deal of things to risk, and a great deal of
things, perchance, will  be won by us. Yet,  if  we do not expose anything to risk,
neither will we gain anything; that, for one, is certain.
This primordial wisdom of everyday experience William James has elevated into a
philosophical  principle,  making  it  one  of  the  cornerstones  of  his  pragmatic
philosophy. At the center of each world-view is the question concerning the value of life
. […]
To  the  question  concerning  the  value  of  life  we  must  thus  respond:  this  is
contingent on the living person. If I tend not to dare anything simply because no
one can prove the value of life to me, I surrender myself to doubt, and the victory of
skepticism is sure, the world around me pitch-black. Should I dare believe, on the
other hand, in the meaning of life even at the risk of error, so life will be luminous
at least on this spot, and if death puts an end to it all, I couldn’t have faced it better.
(Kaila 1912: 84)4
8 In the same essay, Kaila also discusses, albeit only briefly, James’s notorious pragmatist
theory  of  truth,  pointing  out  that  while  James  is  sometimes  obscure  and  even
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contradictory, his theory amounts to the thesis that a mere “agreement” of an idea with
reality  is  insufficient  as  a  criterion  of  truth  and that  we  therefore  have  to  use  the
“working” of ideas as such a criterion (ibid.:  91). Hence, Kaila joins those, presumably
including James himself, who consider the mere correspondence-theoretical “agreement”
between  a  truth  and  what  it  is  true  about  empty  or  trivial  while  endorsing  the
correspondence  theory  as  a  basically  correct  general  account  of  truth.  This  view is,
clearly, compatible with a correspondence theory insisting on the distinction between the
meaning  of  truth  (correspondence)  and  the  criterion  of  truth  (pragmatic  working,
usefulness,  value,  satisfactoriness,  etc.),  even though a more sophisticated pragmatist
account of truth might continue to question the sharpness of this dichotomy between
meaning and criterion. In his review of the 1913 Finnish translation of James’s Pragmatism
, Kaila remarks that the pragmatist theory of truth may remain an “awkward mistake,”
but goes on to say that  all  those preoccupied with “ultimate questions” should read
James’s work (Kaila 1914).
9 On the whole, Kaila’s attitude to James and pragmatism seems to have been very positive
throughout  most  of  the  1910s.  The  pragmatist  theory  of  truth  was  never  his  main
concern; above all, he was interested, as James also was, in the application of pragmatism
to profound weltanschaulichen questions about the significance of  human life  and the
possible role of religion regarding such questions.  He was vitally concerned with the
question  of  whether  we,  being  unable  to  ever  reach  any  certainty  about  religious
conceptions, could nevertheless find some value and direction to our lives. Kaila, then,
was never (even in his early thought) a pragmatist in anything like the full sense of the
term,  but  as  a  reader  of  the  1912  James  essay  easily  notices,  he  did  substantially
contribute to pragmatist examinations of the relation between science and religion, in
particular. Moreover, his contribution was not restricted to his early enthusiasm with
James; nor did he merely embrace and develop Jamesian pragmatist ideas but made, as we
will see, original developments with the pragmatist views he had originally adopted from
James.
 
3. Kaila’s Later Pragmatism: “Practical Testability”
10 Turning to Kaila’s later thought, let us start from the obvious: as a logical empiricist, Kaila
was of course “officially” sharply critical of religion and metaphysics, including the kind
of Jamesian-inspired pragmatist philosophy of religion he had defended in the 1910s.
Famously, leading logical empiricists like Rudolf Carnap maintained that religious and
theological  questions concerning,  say,  theism and atheism were meaningless  pseudo-
problems, lacking cognitive content. The mature Kaila of the 1930-40s was, in the spirit of
the Vienna Circle, primarily a philosopher of science, also introducing modern logical and
epistemological ideas in Finland. However, Kaila never abandoned his early Jamesian idea
that truth about religious issues and, more generally, metaphysical or weltanschaulichen
questions concerning the significance of human life must be assessed from the point of
view of practice.
11 As metaphysical and religious statements fail to meet the rigorous criteria of scientific
meaningfulness  set  by  the  philosophers  of  the  Vienna  Circle,  Kaila’s  criticism  of
metaphysics culminates in the “principle of testability,” a variation of Carnap’s and other
logical empiricists’ related principles: any statement about reality must be constructed in
such  a  way  that  a  set  of  empirical  statements  (the  “real  content”  of  the  original
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statement) can be derived from it; the truth or probability of the statement can only be
assessed on the grounds of its real  content (for detailed formulations,  see the essays
collected in Kaila  1979).  Now,  even though metaphysical  and religious views are not
scientifically acceptable in this sense, they may, as Kaila (1946 [1934]: 365) suggests in his
psychological  magnus  opus on  human  personality,  function  as  “spiritual  insurance
companies” defending us against  various threats  of  life,  especially  the fear of  death.
Metaphysical and religious conceptions need not be entirely fruitless, as they may still be
critically tested and evaluated, albeit only in a practical way.
12 Accordingly,  Kaila  argued  –  pragmatistically,  we  might  say  –  that  religious  and
metaphysical  worldviews may be “practically testable,” even if  they cannot meet the
requirement  of  empirical  testability  applied  to  scientific  theories  because  of  their
minimal “real content.” What Kaila calls practical testability has nothing to do with the
real content of beliefs or statements; rather, it focuses on their results in practical action
and ways of living. Religious and metaphysical ideas may serve as motives for action, and
they may even be endorsed insofar as their practical results are worthwhile (Kaila 1986
[1943]: 188-9). Religions may, then, be acceptable as “systems of action,” not as systems of
beliefs. Their “practical truth” must, however, be distinguished from “truth in the proper
sense,” the pursuit of which is the concern of scientific theories (ibid.: 190). Religions and
religiosity must, furthermore, be clearly distinguished from each other: religiosity is the
“deep-mental”5 or  spiritual  core of  religions.  Mental  life,  Kaila maintained,  is  “deep-
mental” (deeply spiritual) when the depth dimension of an emotion reaches its maximum
value, i.e., when the object of the feeling, some value, is perceived as “sacred” (Kaila 1946
[1934]: 364-5; cf. 239).
13 Taking a somewhat more detailed look at Kaila’s richest elaboration of the concept of
“deep-mentality,” i.e., the book Syvähenkinen elämä (1943, 3rd ed. 1986), it is interesting to
note  that  Kaila  there  explicitly  proposes  to  apply,  “without  restrictions,  the  way  of
thinking called pragmatism,” to metaphysical “explanations of the world,” pointing out
that pragmatism leads to contradictions when applied to theoretical conceptions of the
world but may legitimately be applied to “views of life.” Echoes from the early James
essay are certainly  identifiable  here.  However,  here deep-mentality  is  not  merely an
instrument for saving religious and metaphysical views; it seems to become a normative
concept to be applied in ethics as well; indeed, deep-mentality or spirituality in this sense
is argued to be the most important thing in human life (cf.  Niiniluoto 1992a:  19-20).
However, the basis of this normative concept lies in our biological nature. Kaila remained
a naturalist, though an antireductionist one. From the biological and psychological point
of view, deep-mentality belongs, he argues, to the emergent totality of human needs.
14 The  pragmatically  most  interesting  reasoning  here  proceeds  as  follows  (as  already
anticipated in the 1934 psychology book cited above). While the “real content” of religion
and metaphysics is  small,  virtually zero,  religious and metaphysical  Weltanschauungen
can, according to Kaila, be significant in a practical sense. “Practical testability” does not
assess the real content of a system of beliefs at all, but rather its consequences in our
practical actions and the ways the belief system tested is able to satisfy our human needs.
Kaila,  the son of  a  Lutheran arch-bishop,  did not  approve of  religions as  systems of
beliefs, but he did respect them in his own critical manner and maintained that they
might be (at least partially) justified as systems of action. Eubulos, one of the fictitious
characters and presumably his alter ego in Syvähenkinen elämä, reflects:
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Views of life are testable on the basis of the results they have as motives of action. From
their fruits you shall know them. Those views of life are good which have good
fruits. For my part, I am inclined to judge metaphysical “explanations of the world”
from  this  perspective.  I  would  apply  to  them,  without  restrictions,  the  way  of
thinking  called  pragmatism,  which  leads  to  contradictions  and  other
impossibilities, if applied to theoretical conceptions: whatever is good is “true.” Some
view of life is “true,” that is: acceptable, insofar as it leads to acceptable results
when followed in practice. But this “practical truth” is of course something else
than truth in the proper theoretical sense. (Kaila 1986 [1943]: 189)
15 Hence, while pragmatism for some of its critics was an enemy not only of science and
rationality  but  also  of  ethics  and  objective  values,  humanly  vitally  important  value
judgments and the metaphysical or religious views of life within which such judgments
are embedded were, for Kaila, eventually only pragmatically justifiable.6
16 There are, we may note, a number of important parallels between Kaila and James, even if
we consider Kaila’s mature work. Both men were – especially in early stages of their
careers  –  psychologists  as  much  as  philosophers.  Even  more  strikingly,  both  were
extremely  broad  in  their  intellectual  profiles,  combining  scientific  perspectives  with
strong “romantic” sentiments focusing, rather, on art and religion. Indeed, Syvähenkinen
elämä is explicitly a dialogue between a scientifically-minded and a more romantically-
oriented character with process-metaphysical ideas. In Kaila’s case, perhaps more than
James’s,  the scientific “ego” was stronger.  However,  even in that late work from the
1940s, James’s voice can be heard in Aristofilos, the “romantic” and more metaphysical
character – as Kaila explicitly admits both in the preface and in the dialogue itself (1986
[1943]: 8, 202).  Indeed, Aristofilos points out,  as James himself might have done, that
theoretical and practical testability may in the end collapse into one another, especially
when we are dealing with “theories about the spiritual.”
17 Thus, Kaila’s “scientific” alter ego Eubulos is seriously confronted by Aristofilos, whose
point of view is also to some extent Kaila’s own. It is Eubulos, the scientific-minded clear-
headed  philosopher  representing  logical  empiricism,  who  formulates  the  above-
mentioned  distinction  between  the  two  versions  of  the  testability  principle  and  the
corresponding distinction between truth in its theoretical and practical sense, but it is
Aristofilos,  the  religiously  and  aesthetically  inclined  partner  in  the  dialogue,  whose
pragmatism is more thoroughgoing. His words could indeed have been written by James
himself:7
It seems to me that you are making a mistake when you distinguish in a strict and
principled way between this “theoretical testability” and the “practical testability”
through which the “validity” of views of life is determined. It seems to me, on the
contrary, that they are close to each other. [...]  When we are dealing with theories
about  the  spiritual,  theoretical  and  practical  testability  collapse  together.  (Kaila  1986
[1943]: 192)
18 For example, God may, according to both Kaila’s Aristofilos and William James, need our
faith as a support of His existence (ibid.: 193). This is a suggestion that the “winner” of the
dialogue, Kaila’s scientific ego, of course firmly rejects, but one can hardly deny that Kaila
was internally tormented by these diverging ideas, perhaps partly as a result of his early
admiration of James, a philosopher also tormented by conflicting “temperaments” – and
the  need  to  reconcile  them.  He  may  have  seen the  identification  of  theoretical  and
practical testability as a temptation of his own philosophical temperament (to employ a
Jamesian concept),8 a temptation he nevertheless at least mostly succeeded in resisting.
The two voices  of  the dialogue are  both genuinely his  own,  while  the scientific  one
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ultimately prevails. While Aristofilos is not just an opponent of Kaila’s logical-empiricist
position expressed by Eubulos but an organic part of Kaila himself, it is Eubulos who won
the battle within Kaila – and in Finnish philosophy at large. 
 
4. Kaila and Jamesian Pragmatism: Further S
imilarities and Differences
19 Kaila’s philosophy, when it comes to “ultimate questions,” is very close to James’s at least
in one significant respect: he is, we may say, a “pluralist” not in the metaphysical sense
that would conflict with his monism (cf. von Wright 1992) but in a more metaphilosophical
sense  manifested in  his  philosophical  methodology,  especially  in  the  dialogical  work
Syvähenkinen  elämä.  Different  voices  –  the  different  philosophical  temperaments
appearing in that  book – deserve to be heard,  to be carefully listened to,  and taken
seriously.  While a dialogue may in the end be a disguised monologue (see Kaila 1986
[1943]: 7), and thus “monistic,” there are sometimes genuinely diverging “voices,” e.g.,
scientific  and  religious  ones,  within  a  single  thinker.  Developing  and  maintaining  a
fundamentally monistic view of the world may be a special challenge for such a person, a
challenge that can only be met by engaging in a genuine internal dialogue.
20 James himself,  I  believe, would have been happy with the merging of theoretical and
practical testability – to the extent that something like their integration could even be
regarded as a corner stone of his pragmatism. Moreover, James was characteristically
ambivalent between focusing on the (conceivable, potential) practical effects of believing
something, on the one side, and focusing on the (conceivable, potential) practical effects
that might follow from that belief being true (and he has often been criticized because of
this ambivalence). Insofar as there were, in the end, no fundamental difference between
theoretical and practical testability – that is, insofar as the pragmatic consequences of
one’s believing in a certain (e.g., metaphysical or religious) proposition that might come
about in one’s life played a role in determining the actual content of that proposition and
its “truth” in a more literal sense – this ambivalence would be better justified than it
would if based on a more conventionally realistic picture of beliefs and their relation to a
belief-independent  reality.  To  collapse  this  difference  would  be  to  take  extremely
seriously the original pragmatist idea of beliefs as “habits of action.” It is clear that Kaila
never went that far in his admiration of James – not even in his early 1912 essay – and it is
unclear whether even James ever embraced pragmatism in such a strong form. However,
James’s pragmatism (but presumably not Kaila’s) can be developed into a conception of
ethical values penetrating into the very core of our metaphysical beliefs and postulations
(cf. Pihlström 2009). Such developments of pragmatism might be cashed out in terms of
Kaila’s notions of theoretical and practical testability.
21 In addition to the fact that Kaila was, thus, in the end more scientifically focused than
James,  a  major  philosophical  difference  between  the  two  is  that  while  James  was,
famously,  a  philosophical  pluralist,  Kaila  was  always  strongly  tempted  to  advance  a
monistic position and struggled throughout his career to find an adequate philosophical
expression for this idea. Since his early “philosophical awakening” as a teenager, he was
convinced that the world is a monistic totality (see Kaila 1953; cf. von Wright 1992). At
some  points  of  his  intellectual  development,  he  may  therefore  have  been  close  to
something like the “neutral monism” advocated by Ernst Mach, Bertrand Russell,  and
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others  –  a  position  often  compared  to  James’s  “radical  empiricism”  –  although  he
opposed, from early on, the “superficiality” of such positivistic forms of monism, their
tendency to overlook the highly significant “riddle of reality”; indeed, Kaila never joined
the logical positivists in regarding that problem as a pseudo-issue.9 Another dimension to
Kaila’s monism is metaphilosophical: philosophers’ dialogues, presumably including his
own construction of an imagined dialogue in that book, are often just “monologues in
disguise” (Kaila 1986 [1943]: 7).
22 In any case,  Kaila’s  monism was always non-reductive;10 he never accepted reductive
mechanical materialists’ scientistic views, any more than James did. However, it might
also be suggested that the very controversy between monism and pluralism is among
those  that  should,  on the  basis  of  Kaila’s  own principles,  in  the  end be  evaluated –
“tested” – practically, not theoretically. While Kaila himself viewed this controversy as a
scientific  one,  to  be  settled  within “scientific  philosophy”  –  or,  possibly,  synthetic
philosophy of nature based on the most advanced findings of science – I believe we should
join James in construing the monism vs. pluralism debate in more pragmatic terms, as a
fundamental weltanschaulich issue to be explored in terms of the question concerning our
ability of finding ourselves “at home” in the universe.
23 It is clear that Kaila never became a thoroughgoing pragmatist. As a strict empiricist he
was, despite his early admiration of Bergson and James, unable to arrive at the kind of
dynamic, active, and holistic concept of experience that may be seen as one corner-stone
of pragmatist philosophy. Accordingly, he was never able to build a sustainable bridge
between  normativity  (deep-mentality)  and  naturalness  (its  bio-psychological  basis),
although he sincerely tried. 
24 On the other hand, there is also a touch of pragmatic pluralism in Kaila’s suggestion,
toward the end of the 1912 James essay, that the “man of action” understands the multi-
layered structure of reality better than the person who views the world solely from the
natural-scientific perspective. For a narrow-sighted scientistic reductionist, Beethoven’s
string quartet is just something material and physical (“[r]ubbing horse’s mane against
cat’s  intestines”)  (Kaila  1912:  91;  again quoted from the 2011 English translation).  In
contrast,  the pragmatist realizes that there are multiple contexts and perspectives of
description and inquiry, with their different pragmatic grounds and purposes. The world
as  a  “structured  whole”11 is  thus,  though monistic  in  a  basic  naturalistic  sense,  not
reductively monistic but enormously rich and deep. Within such monism, the conflict
between  monism  and  pluralism  may  in  the  end  vanish,  at  least  as  a  traditional
metaphysical issue, when seen from a pragmatic point of view.12
25 Kaila’s non-reductive monism is in some ways even close to panpsychism, refusing to
draw any dualistic distinction between mind and matter. “Allt är materia, allt är själ,”
“Everything is matter, everything is soul,” as Kaila (1952) put it in the title of one of his
essays written in Swedish.13 For a pragmatist, one way of accounting for the different
“layers”  of  reality  could be  by means of  the kind of  “relativization of  reality”  Kaila
proposed in his late work. According to Kaila, real objects can be “ordered” in terms of
their increasing invariance, which is connected with increasing conceptualization, with
theoretical scientific entities as the most conceptualized (and in a sense the most “real”)
ones.14 While this position is neither Kantian nor pragmatist but in an important sense
scientifically realist, it might be compared to Hilary Putnam’s internal realism, which, in
turn, was one of the most important neopragmatist approaches to the realism issue in the
late twentieth century.15 Kaila’s stance to the problem of realism remains ambivalent, but
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his relativizing move might be employed, by a pragmatist at least, in the non-reductive
project  of  acknowledging  the  (contextualized)  reality  of  both  physical,  scientifically
conceptualized reality and everyday phenomenal experiences – as well  as values and
other cultural structures and processes. This would take us beyond Kaila’s own concerns
with the problem of reality, though.
 
5. Von Wright on Action and Causation
26 Let us now turn to Kaila’s most important pupil, G. H. von Wright, who, as was mentioned,
already referred to pragmatism – Peirce and James – as an informal precursor of logical
empiricism in von Wright (1943), even though pragmatism never explicitly played any
important role in the philosophical views von Wright is famous for all over the world.
27 What I  would like to suggest (as I  have done earlier:  see Pihlström 2014) is that von
Wright’s later philosophy of action and the related theory of causation are the places to
look for any pragmatist aspects of his views. We should, however, start by noting that
there is a sense in which von Wright’s well-known theory of action is not particularly
pragmatist:  it  primarily considers individual actions rather than continuous habits of
action,  whereas  the  latter  instead  of  the  former  would  be  in  the  focus  of  a
paradigmatically pragmatist approach to action theory. However, there are four areas in
which we might view von Wright’s philosophy “pragmatist” in a broad sense.16 
28 First,  von  Wright  (1971,  1974)  famously  defends  a  controversial  theory  of  causation
essentially  linked  with  the  concept  of  action.  He  labels  this  theory  “actionist,”
“manipulative,” and “experimentalist,” suggesting that the notion of cause is “essentially
tied to the idea of action and therefore, as a scientific notion, to the idea of experiment”
(von Wright 1971: 36-7; cf. 189-90; see also von Wright 1974: 57).17 While admitting that
etymology is not decisive here, he also refers to the link between the concepts of cause
and guilt captured by the corresponding words in classical languages (as well as Finnish)
(von Wright 1971: 64-5). Regardless of etymology, “we cannot understand causation, nor
the distinction between nomic connections and accidental uniformities of nature, without
resorting to ideas about doing things and intentionally interfering with the course of
nature”  (ibid.:  65-6).  More precisely,  the  connection between causation and action is
spelled out by von Wright as follows: “p is a cause relative to q, and q an effect relative to
p, if and only if by doing p we could bring about q or by suppressing p we could remove q
or prevent it from happening” (ibid.:  70). Thus, by manipulating the cause we can, in
principle, bring about the effect; this is of course crucial in scientific experimentation.
29 In a slightly later work, von Wright specifies the theory while connecting it to the issue of
determinism.  The  leading  argument  is  that  “[t]he  idea  that  causal  connections  are
necessary connections in nature is  rooted in the idea that there are agents who can
interfere with the natural course of events” (von Wright 1974: 1-2). In our conceptual
order, so to speak, action is the primary concept and causation the secondary one (ibid.:
2). The conclusions he eventually arrives at regarding the determinism vs. indeterminism
dispute  are  not  ontological  or  metaphysical,  either,  but  rather  of  a  conceptual  or
epistemic nature (see ibid.: 136). Von Wright concludes:
To say that to establish the ontic certainty of a change presupposes an epistemic
certainty […] is but another way of saying that establishing causal bonds in nature
presupposes action. It is by virtue of these relationships that I say that the concept
of cause presupposes the concept of action. Action, however, cannot rightly be said
Finnish Versions of Pragmatist Humanism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-1 | 2019
9
to presuppose the existence of ontic alternatives in nature, i.e. the truth of some
form of indeterminism. What action presupposes is only the epistemic certainty
which, as long as it is not undermined, entails the belief in the ontic contingency of
some changes and thus takes for granted a certain margin of indeterminism in the
world. (Ibid.)
30 This  theory  of  causation,  which  might  be  claimed  to  come  somewhat  close  to  the
“interventionist” developments in contemporary discussions of causality and explanation
(e.g., Woodward 2003), has often been criticized because it appears to make causation
“human-centered” in a problematic way. The relations between cause and effect seem to
be relative to what we can, or could, manipulate and what we cannot.  However,  von
Wright  makes  it  clear  that  he  is  not  aiming  at  any  anthropocentric  metaphysics  of
causation, even though he maintains that “to think of a relation between events as causal
is to think of it under the aspect of (possible) action” (von Wright 1971: 74). This is only a
matter of how we must think, or how we (must) organize our concepts; it does not mean
that there is any genuine agency involved in causation (ibid.:  73). Causation, after all,
“operates  throughout  the  universe  –  also  in  spatial  and  temporal  regions  forever
inaccessible to man” (ibid.). Von Wright (1974: 48-50) makes this more precise by saying
that while causation is conceptually dependent on agency, it is “ontically independent of
agency” (ibid.:  49). The “conceptual” dependence lies between “the notion of a (causal)
counterfactual conditional and action,” instead of lying directly between cause and action
(ibid.: 50). Thus, in brief, “the concept of causal connection rests on the concept of action” (
ibid.:  53).  In  any  event,  this  conceptual  link  does  connect  von  Wright’s  views  with
pragmatism: our world-picture generally, including our conception of causal relations in
particular, must be thought of in terms of, or on the basis of, our conception of our own
agency.18
31 The second pragmatist aspect of von Wright’s views I want to highlight emerges from the
fact  that,  while causation must  be thought of  in terms of,  or  “under the aspect  of,”
possible  action,  human actions  cannot,  according  to  von  Wright,  be  simply  causally
explained. To attempt to do so would be to commit a kind of category mistake.  Von
Wright’s (1971, 1980, 1998) “non-causalist” conception of action, agency, and freedom –
and their proper explanation – is arguably more relevant in contemporary philosophy of
mind and action than has been generally acknowledged by mainstream philosophers in
these fields. Von Wright has consistently opposed attempts to reduce intentionality or
agency to a causal, natural-scientific picture of the world.19 The concept of freedom, in
particular,  cannot  be  accommodated in such a  picture.  Denying that  agents  are  free
would be “to commit a contradiction in terms,” while the “mystery” of human freedom is
nothing more than the “mystery” that “there are agents and actions” (von Wright 1980:
77-8). Freedom, then, is a fully non-mysterious feature of agency based on our ability to
understand human beings as persons and to rationally explain their actions on that basis.
No non-natural causal connections between the mental and the physical are presupposed,
because intentions are reasons, not causes; there is no need to postulate such Cartesian-
like interactionist causation, according to von Wright (1998: 109). As Rosaria Egidi (2009)
emphasizes, von Wright shares with Deweyan pragmatism the reconciliatory desire to
develop  a  worldview  rich  enough  for  both  human  agency  and  natural  science  –  a
“naturalistic humanism.”20
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6. Antireductionism and the Disunity of Science
32 Thirdly,  von Wright  might  be  read as  a  pragmatic  pluralist not  only  in  his  theory of
explanation  but  also  at  a  metaphilosophical  level.  He  defends  a  conceptual  and
explanatory pluralism according to which our different levels of inquiry and explanation,
or  different  perspectives  of  description  and  conceptualization  (i.e.,  the  neural,  the
behavioural, and the mental or psychological), each have their own roles to play in our
overall  understanding  of  human  experience  and  action.  These  different  schemes,
“vocabularies” (as a Rortyan pragmatist would prefer to put it), or language-games (in
Wittgensteinian terms) are each legitimate for their own purposes – just like the two
essentially different modes of explanation, the causal and the intentional (teleological),
investigated  in  von  Wright’s  seminal  work  on  explanation  and  understanding  (von
Wright 1971).  When explaining any event taking place in the world,  we must always
explain it under some description, first conceptualizing and thereby understanding it
either as a natural event to be causally explained or as a human action with meaning, to
be intentionally, rationally, and hence teleologically explained. In this sense, explanation
– and even the notion of causation insofar as it is involved in causal explanations, in
contrast to intentional or teleological explanations – is interest-relative (as is, of course,
intentionality or teleology, as well).
33 At this point, we might, in addition to von Wright’s pragmatism, even speak about his
fundamental  Kantianism.  Just  like  Kant  sought  to  reconcile  the  “worlds”  of  causally
determined nature, on the one hand, and human action and moral responsibility, on the
other, von Wright investigates the pragmatic interest-relativity of different explanations
of the “same” world under different aspects. Furthermore, if the same compatibility of
nature and freedom – determinism and moral responsibility – is also a pragmatist theme,
Kantianism and pragmatism seem to converge on this key issue.
34 This idea becomes extremely important in von Wright’s late work on the philosophy of
mind  (von  Wright  1998),  which  is  less  generally  known  and  appreciated  among
philosophers today than his action-theoretical investigations from the 1960s and 1970s.21
Von Wright’s antireductionism and his resistance to any reductively naturalist “unity of
science” also clearly links him to his teacher Kaila, whose antireductionism was discussed
above (see also von Wright 1992). As non-reductive naturalism has been a major theme in
pragmatism – arguably all the way from the classical figures Peirce, James, and Dewey to
contemporary neopragmatists22 –  these two Finnish philosophers’  ways of  developing
similar ideas make them original contributors to a stream of thought at least analogous to
pragmatism if not pragmatist properly speaking.
35 The  difference  to  pragmatism  proper,  however,  is  that  the  different  schemes,
vocabularies, or language-games that von Wright distinguishes and whose irreducibility
he defends are not all ontologically relevant in the same way. While rational (intentional)
explanations of actions, referring to reasons instead of causes (von Wright 1998: 19-20,
38-9), can be said to be epistemically prior to behavioral and neural explanations, because
mental (psychological) states are epistemically prior to neural (physiological) states, and
while behavior in turn can be regarded as semantically prior to mental states, because the
content  of  mental  states  is  available  only through observations of  outward actions,23
neural processes within the organism are, von Wright admits, causally prior to behavior.
In a nutshell, an action, according to von Wright, is a bodily movement “viewed under the
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aspect of intentionality” (ibid.: 142); the muscular activity and the action share the same “
robust reality” while being differently described and conceptualized ( ibid.:  34-5). Thus,
there  is  a  sense  in  which the  neural  or  neuro-physiological  processes  giving rise  to
certain  behavior  are  ontologically  fundamental  in  comparison  to  everything  else  in
human action and agency. The pluralism of relevant conceptualizations and explanations
is not to be conflated with ontological pluralism.
36 This is  a  key contrast  to,  say,  Hilary Putnam’s (1995, 2002)  conceptual  relativity and
pragmatic pluralism – or to James’s (1975 [1907]) pluralistic constructivism, according to
which objects themselves arise out of human purposive practices.24 I would be tempted to
add  that  this  is  also  a  somewhat  non-Wittgensteinian  dimension  in  von  Wright’s
pragmatic pluralism – despite his profound and long-lasting exposition to Wittgenstein’s
work. If any ontological or metaphysical inquiry can be said to be possible or acceptable
in Wittgenstein’s philosophy at all, Wittgenstein would presumably resist the conclusion
(or,  rather,  assumption)  that  some schemes,  vocabularies,  perspectives,  or  language-
games are ontologically serious while some others are not (though in this paper I won’t
make any detailed comments on the Finnish pragmatists’ relations to Wittgenstein, as
important as those relations are). The very distinction von Wright relies on in his theory
of causation, that is, the distinction between, as we may say, the ontological order of the
world and the conceptual order of our ways of thinking about the world – a distinction
crucially manifested in his contention that while the concept of causation presupposes
the concept of agency, causation itself, as operative throughout nature, is independent of
actions and agents  –  is,  for  a  pragmatist,  precisely the problematic  starting-point  of
metaphysical realism that leads to philosophical difficulties. Both classical pragmatists
like James (and even Peirce and Dewey, suitably interpreted) and neopragmatists like
Putnam would argue, in opposition to this distinction, that we can have access only to a
world  that  we  have  conceptualized  from the  perspectives  of  our  practice-embedded
categorial (categorizing) frameworks or language-games. Hence, the distinction between
ontic (ontological) and epistemic (conceptual) conclusions regarding indeterminism to be
drawn from von Wright’s (1974) application of the theory of causation to the determinism
vs.  indeterminism  issue  might  also  be  argued  to  be  problematic  from  a  pragmatist
perspective (cf. again, e.g., Pihlström 2009).
37 Even so,  von Wright  in his  late work arrived at  a  position denying the unity of  the
scientific  worldview  –  maintaining  that  there  is  an  irreducible  plurality  in  our
descriptions  and  explanations  of  reality  in  the  sense  sketched  above  –  and  this
endorsement of the “disunity” of science may be seen as a truly pragmatist theme in his
work. At least von Wright joins the pragmatists, classical and contemporary, in resisting
any reductive physicalism about human action and culture.25 He also joints his teacher
Kaila  in  developing  an  (admittedly  very  different)  combination  of  non-reductive
naturalism and pragmatist humanism.
38 There is, furthermore, one interesting remark in von Wright’s Wittgenstein, in his essay on
Wittgenstein’s  views  on  certainty,  that  connects  von  Wright’s  interpretation  of
Wittgenstein with his theory of action and explanation. Having examined at some length
On Certainty and Wittgenstein’s  (1969)  conception of  the “non-propositional” or “pre-
propositional” – hence pragmatic – character of the “world-picture” and forms of life
underlying our language (cf. also, e.g., Pihlström 2003a), he observes: “But in order that
my behaviour should be describable as actions of a certain kind, it must be interpreted in
terms of the notions of the language-game itself. So, to this extent the praxis at the basis
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of the language-game is a pre-praxis, one could say, and not yet a full-fledged action.” (Von
Wright 1982: 179).
39 This is a profound remark. We too easily speak about action lying at the basis of our
language-games,  or about “deed” being “in the beginning.” Wittgenstein himself  says
things of this kind. But actions properly speaking are something that are always already
conceptualized – they have reasons. They can be conceptualized and understood only
within a language-game, or more generally within a meaningful human practice. Hence,
the “action” that incorporates and manifests our most fundamental  (albeit  revisable)
certainties – the action constituting our “hinges” – cannot really be action in this sense. The
non-propositional  hinges  enabling  language-games  and  meanings  are  not  themselves
meaningful;  in  the  same sense,  the  actions  manifesting  those  hinges  are  not proper
actions.  In  this  pre-praxis,  we  might  say,  we  follow rules  blindly  and our  “spade  is
turned” (cf. Wittgenstein 1953: I, §§ 217, 219).
40 To take a von-Wrightian example:  it  belongs to my “pre-praxis,” to my fundamental
certainties (“hinges”), that I do not first make sure that I still have my two hands before
engaging in the proper “praxis” or action of opening the window (manifested in certain
kind  of  outward  behavior)  with  the  intention  of  cooling  the  room.  However,  the
pragmatist insisting on beliefs and other propositional states being “habits of action”
might resist this division of human behaviors into proper actions and (a kind of) pseudo-
actions, or the corresponding division of our activities into proper praxis and pre-praxis.
There  is,  arguably,  a  continuity here  instead  of  any  sharp  separation  reflecting an
essentialistic difference. The very notion of a habit of action can be employed to highlight
this continuity.26
 
7. Concluding Remarks: Kaila and von Wright as P
ublic Philosophers
41 The fourth dimension of von Wright’s so-called pragmatism is presumably better known
to  his  Finnish  and  Scandinavian  colleagues  and  followers  than  to  his  international
academic  audience.  In  his home country  Finland,  he  was  a  widely  respected “public
philosopher” in a manner perhaps comparable to, say, Dewey in the United States or even
Jean-Paul Sartre in France. Probably his best known work in this area is Vetenskapen och
förnuftet (Science and Reason, 1986), which criticizes the self-destructive tendencies of
Western  civilization,  particularly  the  way  in  which human reason itself,  through its
scientific  and technological  advances and applications,  has driven the world close to
ecological destruction.27 Had he lived to witness the growing worries about the global
climate change in the 2000s, he might have ended up even more pessimistic than he was
in his old days.
42 Clearly, a pragmatist thinker may be expected to be active in public issues such as
environmental  problems,  social  policy,  or  war  and  peace.  In  contrast  to  many
pragmatists’ (especially Dewey’s) progressivism and optimism, von Wright as a publically
well-known figure commenting on deep issues facing our human civilization shared the
cultural  pessimism  of  figures  like  Wittgenstein  and  Oswald  Spengler.  Neither
Wittgenstein nor von Wright felt completely “at home” in the world and culture they
lived in.  Thus,  again,  he was not  a  pragmatist  properly speaking while  developing a
pragmatic way of doing philosophy as cultural criticism. The kind of profile as a public
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philosopher that Kaila had was somewhat different – and closer to that of someone like
James.  For Kaila,  public engagements by philosophers were essential  (or so it  seems)
primarily because the kind of “ultimate questions” he dealt with in Syvähenkinen elämä
deserved  to  be  discussed  in  a  generally  accessible  way;  while  Kaila  himself  was  an
aristocratic elitist, he seems to have felt that his general readers and listeners had a right
to find deeper layers of meaning in their lives, and that he could offer something like
philosophical guidance in this respect.
43 Von  Wright’s  and  Kaila’s  cases  demonstrate  that  one  can  be  a  pragmatist  in  many
different ways. Here we may see pragmatic contextuality and (Wittgensteinian) family
resemblance at work. One can be a pragmatist in “first-order” issues but also in “second-
order” or meta-level ones, or both. There is very little we find in von Wright’s thought
that can be directly linked with pragmatism, but at the meta-level there is, in fact, a lot.
44 To  sum  up,  we  may  say  that  Kaila  was  a  logical  empiricist  and,  perhaps,  a  quasi-
pragmatist  with  explicit  Jamesian  influences,  while  von  Wright  was  never  really
influenced or even very much inspired by any of the old pragmatists. He was, thus, an
original “European pragmatist” in the sense that his pragmatic view of causation was
truly his  own innovation,  not  derived from any of  the pragmatist  classics  (unlike,  it
seems, Kaila’s idea of practical testability, which can to a certain degree be traced back to
James). As a quasi-pragmatist, von Wright was, then, more independent, but both were
equally independent as central figures of Finnish and European philosophy throughout
the twentieth century.
45 Kaila’s and von Wright’s pupils and followers developed their own versions of pragmatic
humanism – or so, at least, we may interpret Oiva Ketonen’s work on naturalism in a
broadly Deweyan context, and possibly even Ilkka Niiniluoto’s critical scientific realism,
which  is  to  a  large  extent  based  on  Peircean  ideas  of  scientific  progress,  while
maintaining  a  humanistic  acknowledgment  of  the  autonomy  of  philosophy  and  its
irreducibility to empirical science.28 On the other hand, Jaakko Hintikka’s relation to this
tradition (if it can be called by that name) seems to be much more complicated.29 In a way
or  another,  all  these  Finnish  thinkers  have  engaged  in  a  critical  dialogue  with  the
program of naturalism and naturalization in analytic and post-analytic philosophy. In
this sense,  too,  their projects resemble the classical pragmatists’  and are also central
background views for those of us (in Finland and elsewhere) working on the history of
pragmatism.
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NOTES
1. The topic of this paper has been more comprehensively discussed in several earlier writings of
mine: see Pihlström 2001, 2003b, 2010, 2012, 2014; see also Pihlström 2015. This essay is indebted
to those previous investigations of “Finnish pragmatism.”
2. Hintikka’s relation to pragmatism would clearly deserve a separate comprehensive study. In
particular, his research on Peirce and abduction is an original contribution to the development of
the  specifically  Peircean  strand  of  pragmatism  (as  is  Niiniluoto’s  work  on  abduction;  cf.
Niiniluoto 2018).  It  might be mentioned that Hintikka was President of  the Charles S.  Peirce
Society in the 1990s.
3. In addition to his early articles on James, he also published a brief monograph in Finnish on
Ernest Renan’s  work  on  religion  (Kaila  1917),  dealing  with  related  matters.  Kaila’s  most
important writings, including some of the early pieces of the 1910s (e.g., the James article and
selections of the Renan book), are collected in Kaila 1990. The writings on Renan, James, and
other  figures  testify  about  Kaila’s  deep  interest  in  religious  issues  and  the  conflict  between
science and religion.
4. I am here quoting from Heikki A. Kovalainen’s 2011 translation of Kaila 1912, though otherwise
my page references are to the reprinted version of the original Finnish essay available in Kaila
1990. The last sentence in the quotation seems to have been taken almost directly from James’s
essay, “What Makes Life Worth Living,” reprinted in James 1979 [1897].
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5. Niiniluoto, in his introduction to Niiniluoto et al. 1992, uses this as a translation of Kaila’s most
original  terminus  technicus,  “syvähenkisyys.”  This  concept  has  been discussed in  Jääskeläinen
1983, Niiniluoto 1992a, and Salmela 1998, among other secondary sources. See also the essays in
Niiniluoto & Pihlström 2012.
6. It is, however, still an open question whether we should say that what Kaila thought to be
pragmatically acceptable or justifiable could be regarded as (pragmatically) “true.” Kaila clearly
does  not  follow the  pragmatists  all  the  way down,  because  he  still  insists  on  distinguishing
between  theoretical and  practical  testability  (and  truth).  Furthermore,  Salmela  (1998,  2012)
claims that Kaila’s principle of practical testability is applicable only to religion and metaphysics,
not to value judgments. There is still room for further scholarly discussion of Kaila’s metaethical
position: did he subscribe to some kind of emotivism, or are his treatments of deep-mentality
reinterpretable  on the  basis  of  a  pragmatic  moral  realism? For  a  detailed account  of  Kaila’s
relation  to  other  twentieth-century  Finnish  developments  in  the  philosophy  of  culture  and
values, see Salmela 1998.
7. Kaila does regard James (along with Carlyle and Tolstoy) as one of the background figures of
Aristofilos’s feelings about life (see Kaila 1986 [1943]: 8, 202). Kaila’s diaries in 1941-48 indicate
that he was thinking about James while preparing the manuscript of Syvähenkinen elämä during
World War II. He mentions James at least on December 13, 1941, and on May 4, 1942. On January
24, 1943, he formulates the distinction between theoretical and practical testability.
8. On the notion of a philosophical temperament, see James 1975 [1907], Lecture I.
9. On Kaila’s life-long concern with the issue of scientific realism and the “riddle of reality” in the
context of the logical empiricists’ criticism of metaphysics, see Niiniluoto 1992b, 2012, 2017; cf.
also Neuber 2012.
10. See von Wright 1992 for some elaborations of this.
11. Kaila’s  last work,  only fragments of which were posthumously published,  was tentatively
titled Hahmottuva maailma (“The World as a Structuring Whole,” or perhaps just “The Structuring
World,” or maybe “The Self-Structuring World”). For English translations of some material that
Kaila intended as part of that volume, see Kaila 1979, especially the essay “The Perceptual and
Conceptual Components of Everyday Experience” (259-312).
12. Compare James’s own discussion of monism and pluralism in James 1975 [1907], Lecture IV.
While  James  obviously  favors  pluralism,  even  that  conflict  is  for  him  an  issue  that  needs
pragmatic adjudication.
13. This 1952 paper is reprinted in Kaila 1992.
14. Again,  see the elaboration of  this  idea in Kaila’s  posthumous essay,  “The Perceptual  and
Conceptual Components of Everyday Experience,” in Kaila 1979. See also Niiniluoto (1992b: 111).
15. This is suggested, with some reservations, in Niiniluoto (1992b: 112-3). I agree with Matthias
Neuber (2012) that Kaila cannot be interpreted as an internal realist in the Putnamian sense,
because he never accepted the Kantian view that reality is dependent on our conceptualizations
and categorizations. (This Kantian idea is in my view crucial in pragmatist and neopragmatist
ways of dealing with the problem of realism. I would also be happy to agree with Neuber that
Putnamian internal realism, at least insofar as it is a pragmatist position, is indeed very close to
Kantian-like idealism.) Even so, the link between conceptualization and reality is tight in Kaila.
16. The Library of Living Philosophers volume devoted to von Wright (Schilpp & Hahn 1989) does
not  seem  to  recognize  von  Wright’s  pragmatist  aspects  in  any  explicit  way.  See,  however,
Hartshorne 1989.
17. Huw Price’s work on causation might be seen as coming close to von Wright’s, because Price
(2011:  31)  also  suggests  that  “uses  of  causal  concepts  in  science”  may  reflect  the  “agentive
perspective.”
18. Regarding  this  deep  connection  between  the  ways  we  talk  and  think about  the  world
generally and the ways we talk and think about human agency, it might be speculated that von
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Wright’s later views on the conceptual dependence of causation on action might be partly based
on, or at least parallel to, his earlier idea – originated during his Cambridge years (1948-1951),
leading up to his pioneering work on modal and deontic logic, with the first publications in the
early 1950s – that there is an analogy between the behaviors of the standard quantifiers of first-
order predicate logic,  on the one hand, and the operators expressing modalities and deontic
modalities, on the other. Thus, our basic logical concepts “some,” “all,” and “no” can be seen as
functioning in ways analogous to modal concepts (“possible,” “necessary,” and “impossible”) and
deontic  ones  (“allowed,”  “obligated,”  “forbidden”).  Von Wright  (2001:  179)  tells  us  that  this
analogy came to him as a sudden insight when he was walking along the river Cam (presumably
around 1950). 
19. On the relevance of von Wright’s “actionistic” account of causation for an “anti-naturalistic”
“humanization of nature,” see Egidi (1999: 4-5). Similarly, pragmatists are generally naturalists,
but their naturalism is never reductive but always already “humanized” – and the same, as we
saw,  holds  for  von Wright’s  teacher  Kaila.  Calcaterra  (1999)  is  one  of  the  very  few scholars
explicitly comparing von Wright’s theory of action and (James’s) pragmatism, pointing toward a
“non-causalistic” theory of action and an “emancipation of the discussion about human freedom
from traditional epistemological and ontological approaches” (ibid.: 139). See Egidi’s (1999, ed.)
volume more broadly for several investigations of von Wright’s views on action (among other
things) and their significance for “humanistic” philosophy.
20. As von Wright explains in his autobiography (von Wright 2001), he later came to resist the
term “humanism,” though. For more recent discussions of von Wright’s humanism and his views
on “the human condition,” see Niiniluoto & Wallgren 2017.
21. I am here indebted to Antti Kuusela’s (2010) work on von Wright’s philosophy of mind, with
comparisons to not only Wittgenstein but also Donald Davidson.
22. Dewey, of course, contributed to the logical empiricists’ International Encyclopedia of Unified
Science with his Theory of Valuation in 1940 and was in this sense not exactly a critic of the “unity
of science” movement but rather one of its supporters. On the other hand, Dewey’s version of
pragmatic naturalism is clearly one of the most influential accounts of non-reductive naturalism
available. It would require another inquiry to determine in what sense exactly a non-reductive
(and in this sense “rich” or “soft”) version of naturalism can be committed to the idea of “unity”
(i.e., in what sense, if any, unity itself can be reconstructed in a non-reductive manner).
23. The mental, von Wright (1998: 162) tells us, is “the meaning of complex patterns of bodily
reactions.”
24. See also Pihlström 2009 for some developments of these versions of pragmatism.
25. Von Wright’s view on causation has also inspired, among others,  Karl-Otto Apel (cf.  Apel
1998: 22-3, 133). The “interventionist” position has been important for Apel as a background idea
in  his  defense  of  critical  hermeneutics  and  “transcendental  pragmatism”  in  the  Erklären  vs.
Verstehen controversy (see also Wallgren 2003: 543). 
26. The issue of continuity is also related to the question concerning the possible intentionality
(or  lack  thereof)  of  the  actions  or  behaviors  of  higher  animals.  Is  there  an  evolutionary
continuity  here or  a  fundamental  difference between our intentional  actions and the purely
causally explainable non-intentional (though possibly intentional-seeming) behavior of animals?
I must here leave this question untouched, but I should like to note that the difference between
those who find human beings essentially different from animals in this regard and those who
find them not essentially different but only very different – that is, see them continuous yet very
far  from  each  other  regarding  capacities  for  reasoned  action  –  may  itself  be  a  problematic
distinction, or even a distinction without (pragmatic) difference. The pragmatic method could
perhaps  be  employed  here  in  order  to  show  that  there  is  no  conceivable  difference  in  the
potential practical effects of these only apparently different views. I imagine that this issue could
be interestingly investigated in the context of Kaila’s and von Wright’s ideas, too.
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27. Some of von Wright’s “cultural” writings of this kind have been translated into English: see
von Wright 1993. Here I am not even trying to summarize his profound views on “the myth of
progress,”  the  self-destructiveness  of  human  reason,  and  cultural  pessimism.  Von  Wright’s
career as a cultural discussant did not begin with his politically engaged comments in the 1960s
but goes back to his early essays in the 1940s on Dostoevsky and Tolstoy.
28. In their distinctive ways, Ketonen and Niiniluoto have also continued the tradition of “public
philosophy.” For example, in his popular writings and talks, Niiniluoto has recently been a strong
critic of the corruption of the commitment to reason and truth in our “post-truth” era.
29. I have deliberately avoided discussing any of Hintikka’s complex views here, as his relations
to pragmatism would deserve a separate analysis (cf., e.g., Hintikka 1998, as well as footnote 2
above). He was obviously greatly influenced by both Kaila and especially von Wright. 
ABSTRACTS
This essay introduces two leading Finnish philosophers of the twentieth century, Eino Kaila and
Georg Henrik von Wright, who not only established analytic philosophy in Finland but also made
original contributions to the development of pragmatism. The pragmatist dimensions of Kaila’s
thought were clearly influenced by the classical American pragmatists, primarily William James,
whose writings Kaila read and commented on already at an early stage of his career in the 1910s.
Kaila  then continued to  develop a  quasi-pragmatist  idea  of  “practical  testability”  during  his
logical empiricist period in the 1930s and 1940s. Unlike Kaila,  von Wright was never directly
inspired by James or any other classical pragmatists, although he did refer to Peirce and James as
informal precursors of logical empiricism in the 1940s. His highly original theories of human
action and causation,  mostly  developed in  the 1970s,  contain interesting pragmatist  aspects,
however. Both Kaila and von Wright, moreover, shared a life-long engagement with an issue that
also troubled all the classical pragmatists: a reconciliation of a “humanist” philosophy with a
thoroughgoing appreciation of the natural sciences. Thus, they both developed non-reductive
versions of naturalism (or naturalist versions of pragmatist humanism) that, in their emphasis on
the disunity of science, were not terribly far from the positions of classical pragmatists like James
and Dewey.
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